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Lecture 09 – Internatinaa Ecinimics
The Instruments if Trade Piaicy
Preview
• Partal equilirriu  analysis of trade policy in a singlle industry:  
costs and renefts
• I port tarifs
• Export sursidies
• I port quotas
• Voluntary export restraints, Local content require ents, Local 
standards
• General discussion on free trade policies and trade 
interventon.
The partaa ecinimic appriach ti trade
• Let’s ruild the impirt demand curve:  the diference retween the quantty 
that Ho e consu ers de and  inus the quantty that Ho e producers 
supply, at each price.
• The Ho e i port de and curve 
MD = D – S 
intercepts the price axis at PA and is downward slopingl:  
– As (relatve) price increases, the quantty supplied ry producers 
increases rut the quantty de anded decreases.
– Hence, the quantty if impirts demanded decaines.
  The partaa ecinimic appriach ti trade (2)
The partaa ecinimic appriach ti trade (3)
• Let’s ruild the expirt suppay curve as the diference retween the quantty 
that Foreigln producers supply inus the quantty that Foreigln consu ers 
de and, at each price.
• The Foreigln export supply curve 
XS* = S* – D*
 intersects the price axis at PA* and is upward slopingl:  
– As (relatve) price increases, the quantty supplied ry producers 
increase rut the quantty de anded decreases. 
– Hence, the quantty if expirts suppaied rises.
  The partaa ecinimic appriach ti trade (4)
The partaa ecinimic appriach ti trade (5)
• In equilirriu , 
i port de and = export supply,
ho e de and – ho e supply
               = foreigln supply – foreigln de and,
ho e de and + foreigln de and 
    = ho e supply + foreigln supply,
wirad demand = wirad suppay.
The partaa ecinimic appriach ti trade (6)
Impirt Tarifs
• An impirt tarif is a tax levied when a glood is i ported.
– It raises glovern ent revenues and protects do estc producers.
– It hits do estc consu ers
• A specifc tarif is levied as a fxed chargle for each unit of i ported gloods.
– For exa ple, $3 per rarrel of oil.
• An ad vaairem tarif is levied as a fracton of the value of i ported gloods.
– For exa ple, 25% tarif on the price of i ported oil.
• Many exa ples of tarifs on agricuaturaa impirts since the reglinningl of the 
19° century (UK - Corn Laws); Ger any and U.S.:  tarifs on industriaa impirts 
at the end of the 19° century…
• Today:   ore protecton througlh nontarif rarriers, such as i port quotas 
and export restraints, than througlh tarifs.
The Efects if an Impirt Tarif
• Assu e a co pettve arket
• Assu e that, in arsence of trade, the price of the glood is higlher in Ho e 
than in Foreigln.
• With specializaton and trade, the glood will re exported fro  Foreigln 
(i ported to Ho e) untl the price diference is eli inated.
• A tarif acts aike a transpirtatin cist,  akingl foreigln sellers unwillingl to 
ship gloods unless the Ho e price exceeds the Foreigln price ry the 
a ount of the tarif: 
      PT = P*T + t
• A tarif  akes the price rise in the Ho e  arket and fall in the Foreigln 
 arket.
• Trade decreases (fro  QW to QT).
The Efects if an Impirt Tarif (2)
The Efects if an Impirt Tarif (3)
• The quantty that Ho e i ports equals the quantty of Foreigln exports 
when:          PT – P*T = t
• The increase in the price in Ho e can be aess than the a ount of the 
tarif.
• Part of the efect of the tarif causes the Foreigln export price to decline, 
rut this efect is usually very s all, and depends on the country “size”.
– When a country is “smaaa,” it has ni efect in the fireign (wirad) 
price recause its de and is an insiglnifcant part of world de and for 
the glood.
– The foreigln price does not fall, rut re ains at Pw .
– The price in the ho e  arket rises ry the full a ount of the tarif, to 
PT = Pw + t ..
A Tarif in a Smaaa Ciuntry
Weafare anaaysis if Tarifs
• A tarif raises the price of a glood in the i portngl country, so it hurts 
cinsumers and benefts priducers there. In additon, the glovern ent 
gains tarif revenue.
• How to easure these costs and renefts?
• Social Welfare analysis usingl the concepts of consu er surplus and 
producer surplus.
• Cinsumer surpaus: co puted as the diference retween the price actually 
paid and the axi u  price they would re willingl to pay for each unit.
• Priducer surpaus:  co puted as the diference retween the price received 
and the ini u  price at which they would re willingl to sell.
Cinsumer and Priducer Surpaus
Cists and Benefts if Tarifs
• A tarif raises the price in the i portngl country: 
– cinsumer surpaus decreases (consu ers worse of – area a+b+c+d) 
– priducer surpaus increases (producers reter of – area a).
– the givernment ciaaects tarif revenue equal to the tarif rate t es 
the quantty of i ports with the tarif.
     t QT = (PT – PT* ) (D2 – S2)
– The glovern ent is beter iff (area c+e)
• Changle in welfare due to the tarif is 
Producer gain + Government revenue - Consumer loss
a + (c + e) – (a+ r + c +d) = e – r – d.
Cists and Benefts if Tarifs (2)
Cists and Benefts if Tarifs (3)
• For a “largle” country, whose i ports and exports afect wirad prices, the 
weafare efect if a tarif is hence ambiguius.
• b and d represent the efciency aiss: The tarif distorts producton 
(producers produce too uch – b) and consu pton (consu ers consu e 
too litle – d).
• The rectanglle e represents the terms if trade gain: The tarif lowers the 
Foreigln price, allowingl Ho e to ruy its i ports cheaper.
• Part of glovern ent revenue (e) represents the ter s of trade glain, and 
part (c) counter-ralances so e of the loss in consu er surplus.
– The glovern ent glains at the expense of consu ers and foreiglners
• If the ter s of trade glain exceeds the efciency loss, then natinaa 
weafare wiaa increase under a tarif, at the expense of foreigln countries.
– However, fireign ciuntries are apt ti retaaiate.
• For a s all country (e very s all) the cists if a tarif exceed its benefts.
Weafare Anaaysis if an Expirt Subsidy
• An export sursidy can also re specifc or ad valorem:
– A specifc subsidy is a pay ent per unit exported.
– An ad vaairem subsidy is a pay ent as a share of the value exported.
• When Ho e i poses an export sursidy, the dimestc price rises, 
decreasing cinsumer surpaus (area a + b) and increasing priducer 
surpaus (area a + b + c).
• Also, givernment revenue faaas due to payingl s XS  for the export sursidy 
(area b + c + d + e + f + g).
• The net weafare aiss is hence:  b + d + e + f + g.
• An export sursidy lowers the price paid in Foreigln PS* = PS – s.
– An expirt subsidy wirsens the terms if trade ry loweringl the price 
of exports in world arkets and leads to a net welfare loss.
Weafare Anaaysis if an Expirt Subsidy (2)
The EU Cimmin Agricuaturaa Piaicy
• Traditonally, the EU’s Co  on Aglricultural Policy sets high prices for 
aglricultural products and subsidizes expirts to dispose of excess 
producton.
– Given the largle size of the EU  arket, the sursidized exports reduce 
world prices of aglricultural products.
• The cost of this policy for European taxpayers has reen est ated to re 
$30 rillion ore than its renefts (in 2007).
• What to do? Consider the social i portance of supportngl the aglricultural 
sector (for supportngl far ers and for gloals of food sovereiglnty, 
environ ental protecton and territorial develop ent). 
– Recent refor  of the CAP (2013) where the price foor and the export 
sursidies have reen replaced ry an incime suppirt ti farmers (SFP – 
Singlle Far  Pay ent).
Impirt Quitas
• An impirt quita is a restricton on the quantty of a glood that  ay re 
i ported.
• This restricton is usually enforced ry issuingl aicenses ir quita rights, in 
 ost cases to do estc i porters; in other cases to foreigln exporters or 
glovern ents.
• A rindingl i port quota will push up the price of the i port recause the 
quantty de anded will exceed the quantty supplied ry Ho e producers 
and fro  i ports.
• When a quota instead of a tarif is used to restrict i ports, the 
glovern ent receives ni revenue (unless the license syste  is  anagled 
througlh an auctin).
– Instead, the revenue fro  sellingl i ports at higlh prices gloes to quita 
aicense hiaders. These extra revenues are called quita rents.
– An i port quota is always worse than an i port tarif.
Impirt Quitas (2)
The U.S. Impirt Quita in Sugar
• In 2013 the U.S. quota on suglar i port was est ated to:  
– reduce consu er surplus ry $884 Ml (consu ers’ per capita loss of $3 
per year).
– raise producer surplus ry $272 Ml (producers’ i plicit sursidy of 
$42,000 per worker)
– yield quota rents to foreigln glovern ents ry $453 Ml
–  ake deadweiglht loss (prod. and cons. distorton) ry $159 Ml
• Saved jors?
– if the quota saves 30% of e ploy ent in suglar industry, the cost per 
saved jor is $432,000
– if higlher suglar prices reduce e ploy ent in the confectonary 
industry, the quota overall destroys jors.
Viauntary Expirt Restraint
• A viauntary expirt restraint works like an i port quota, except that the 
VER is i posed ry the exportngl country rather than the i portngl 
country.
• These restraints are usually requested by the impirtng ciuntry.
– Exa ple:  Japan’s VER on auto oriles to U.S. in 1981
• The profts or rents fro  this policy are earned ry foreigln glovern ents or 
foreigln producers.
– Foreiglners sell a restricted quantty at an increased price.
– Neglatve i pact on price (higlher) and incentve to innovate.
Licaa Cintent Requirement
• A aicaa cintent requirement (LCR) is a reglulaton that requires a specifed 
fracton of a fnal glood to re produced do estcally.
• It ay re specifed in value ter s, ry requiringl that so e ini u  share 
of the value of a glood represents ho e value added, or in physical units.
• Fro  the viewpoint of do estc producers of inputs, a LCR privides 
pritectin in the sa e way that an i port quota would.
• Fro  the viewpoint of fr s that  ust ruy ho e inputs, however, the 
require ent does not place a strict li it on i ports, rut allows fr s to 
i port ore if they also use ore ho e parts.
• Local content require ent provides neither givernment revenue (as a 
tarif would) nir quita rents.
• Instead, the diference retween the prices of ho e gloods and i ports is 
averagled into the price of the fnal glood and is passed in ti cinsumers.
A Summary if Trade Piaicy Efects
• For each trade policy, the price rises in the Ho e country adoptngl the 
policy.
– Hime priducers suppay mire and gain. 
– Hime cinsumers demand aess and aise.
• The world price falls when Ho e is a “largle” country that afects world 
prices; it does not changle if Ho e is a “s all” country.
• Tarifs generate givernment revenue; export sursidies drain it; i port 
quotas do not afect glovern ent revenue.
• All these trade policies create priductin and cinsumptin distirtins.
• Other Trade policies: 
– Givernment pricurement (Govern ent aglencies are orliglated to 
purchase fro  ho e suppliers).
– Bureaucratc reglulatons (Safety, health, quality, or custo s 
reglulatons can act as nin-tarif barriers ti trade)
A Summary if Trade Piaicy Efects (2)
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Envirinmentaa standards and trade
• A naton’s environ ental standards deter ine the level of acceptarle 
polluton that ay re glenerated fro  producton.
• Strict envirinmentaa standards are expected to raise the costs of 
producton. 
– These increased costs  ay reduce (or re ove) a country’s 
co paratve advantagle in producton and alter the patern of trade.
– In order to aintain co paratve advantagle, a naton ay reduce its 
environ ental protectons.
– This ay spur a “race ti the bitim.”
• This concern has spurred calls for inclusion of environ ental leglislaton 
alongl with aglree ents to lower rarriers to trade.
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Envirinmentaa standards and trade (2)
• However, environ ental standards are ifen ippised ry glovern ents of 
low- and iddle-inco e countries.
• Their point:  standards set ry higlh-inco e countries would re expensive for 
local producers and would act as a pritectinist piaicy.
• So et es they are even opposed ry rich countries.
– The U.S. have reen reluctant to reduce e issions accordingl to the Kyoto 
protocol (untl Ora a), and to honor the Paris accord (under Tru p).
• As poor countries glrow richer, they produce and consu e  ore, leadingl to 
 ore environ ental deglradaton. But they also want to pay for  ore 
stringlent environ ent protecton.
– This ay lead to an envirinmentaa Kuznets curve
• Sa e ratonale apply to aabiur and safety standard reguaatin.
Emissiin and the Envirinmentaa Kuznets Curve
Free Trade Piaicies: the pris
• Free trade allows producers and consu ers to aaaicate resiurces mist 
efcientayi
• Natonal welfare of a s all country is higlhest with free trade.
• However, recause current tarif rates are already low for  ost countries, the 
estmated benefts of  ovingl to  ore free trade are only a s all fracton of 
natonal inco e for ost countries.
• The glains fro  free trade are so ewhat s aller for advanced econo ies such 
as the United States and Europe and simewhat aarger for poorer developingl 
countries.
Free Trade Piaicies: the Pris (2)
• Free trade allows to glain fro  ecinimies if scaae.
– Protected  arkets li it glains fro  externaa econo ies of scale ry 
inhiritngl the glrowth of industries and also li it glains fro  internaa 
econo ies:  Each fr  operates on an inefcient scale.
– Exa ple:  due to protecton, in 1964 Arglentna had 13 car  akers, 
producingl a total of 166K cars, when the efcient scale of a singlle 
plant was retween 80K and 200K cars.
• Free trade renefts  ost efcient fr s and drives out of the  arket least 
efcient fr s, raising priductvity.
• Free trade provides cimpettin and incentves fir innivatin (dyna ic 
renefts). Such glains are difcult to quantfy.
• Free trade avoids the loss of resources througlh rent seeking:  t e and other 
resources spent seekingl quota riglhts and the proft that they will earn.
• Free trade is the best feasible piaicy, even thouglh there  ay re reter 
policies in principle:  Any policy that deviates fro  free trade would re quickly 
 anipulated ry politcal glroups, leadingl to lower natonal welfare.
  Free Trade Piaicies: the Cins
• (1) EXISTENCE OF AN OPTIMAL TARIFF:  For a “largle” country, a tarif 
lowers the price of i ports in world arkets, with a terms if trade gain.
– This reneft may exceed the losses caused ry distortons in 
producton and consu pton.
– A s all tarif iglht lead to an increase in welfare for a largle country.
– But at so e tarif rate, the natonal welfare will reglin to decrease as 
the econo ic efciency loss exceeds the ter s of trade glain.
– So there is an iptmum tarif, which axi izes natonal welfare.
Free Trade Piaicies: the Cins (2)
• An export tax (a neglatve export sursidy) that co pletely prohirits 
exports leaves a country worse of, rut a s all export tax rate  ay 
 axi ize natonal welfare througlh the ter s of trade.
– Fir aarge ciuntries aike the U.S. ir the EU, an impirt tarif and/ir 
expirt tax ciuad imprive weafare at the expense if ither ciuntries.
– But this arglu ent iglnores the likelihood that other countries  ay 
retaaiate ry enactngl their own trade restrictons:  the issue here is 
piaitcaa piwer.
– Yet in so e cases, like Saudi Araria’s taxes on oil export and 
Arglentna’s taxes on soya export, it is plausirle that renefts exceed 
costs..
Free Trade Piaicies: the Cins (3)
• (2) DOMESTIC MARKET FAILURES  ay cause free trade to re a sur-
opt al policy. In fact the previous welfare analysis assu es that arkets 
“functon well” (they are co pettve).
• Types of arket failures include: 
– Persistentay high underempaiyment of workers, underutlizaton of 
structures, equip ent, and other for s of capital; Property riglhts not 
well defned or well enforced; Environ ental costs for society caused 
ry private producton, rut for which private fr s do not fully pay.
– It is possirle that when a tarif increases do estc producton, the 
reneft to do estc society will increase due to the arket failure.
Free Trade Piaicies: the Cins (4)
• The do estc arket failure arglu ent aglainst free trade is an exa ple of 
a ore gleneral arglu ent called the theiry if the secind best:
– Govern ent interventon that distorts  arket incentves in one 
 arket  ay increase natonal welfare ry ofsetngl the consequences 
of arket failures elsewhere.
– Econo ists supportngl free trade counter-arglue that do estc arket 
failures should re corrected ry a “frst-rest” policy:  a do estc policy 
ai ed directay at the siurce if the pribaem.
– Moreover, if it is difcult to quantfy and address  arket failures 
directly, it is even  ore difcult to address the  indirectly, througlh 
sophistcated trade policies.
– Govern ent policies to address  arket failures are then likely to re 
manipuaated by piaitcaaay piwerfua griups.
– Due to distortngl the incentves of producers and consu ers, trade 
policy  ay have unintended consequences that  ake a situaton 
worse, not reter.
Summary
● A tarif increases the ho e price and the quantty supplied and reduces the 
quantty de anded and the quantty traded; also decreases the world 
price when the country is “largle.”
● A quota does the sa e; an export sursidy does the sa e.
● Tarifs glenerate glovern ent revenue; export sursidies drain it; i port 
quotas, VER and LCR are revenue neutral.
● The welfare efect of a tarif, quota, or export sursidy can re easured ry 
efciency loss fro  cinsumptin and priductin distirtins.
• Environ ental, larour, safety and territorial protecton reglulatons are 
needed rut they can re seen as nin-tarif barriers ti trade.
• On the opposite side, exportngl countries  iglht play “envirinmentaa ir 
siciaa dumping”.
• The econo ic arglu ents pro or aglainst free trade shif the discussion to 
 ore politcal arglu ents (next lecture).
